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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-00380-001 & 2-10-cr-00500-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 5, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Martin Scott Wolfe (“Wolfe”) appeals from his conviction and sentence in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  For the reasons stated below, 




 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 In 2003, Wolfe was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida for knowingly transporting an individual in interstate commerce with the intent 
to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421.  Wolfe pleaded guilty, and 
was sentenced to 100 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised 
release.  In August of 2009, Wolfe was released from prison and returned to his mother’s 
home in Philadelphia to begin his term of supervised release.  Because his 2003 
conviction involved the solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution, Wolfe was 
required to register as a sex offender in his state of residence pursuant to the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (“SORNA”).  Wolfe 
registered his status and local address (his mother’s residence) with the Pennsylvania 
State Police.  He was informed that he was required to notify the Pennsylvania State 
Police within 48 hours of any change in residence, and that he was required to register in 
any new state of residence within 48 hours. 
 After Wolfe missed two appointments for drug testing with the Probation Office, 
his probation officer visited his mother’s Philadelphia residence and discovered that he 
had left one week prior.  On January 13, 2009, Wolfe’s probation officer filed a petition 
to revoke Wolfe’s supervised release for failing to comply with random drug testing and 
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failing to notify the Probation Office of his change in residence.  A warrant was issued 
for his arrest.  Wolfe was arrested two months later in Egg Harbor Township, New 
Jersey, for operating an unregistered vehicle.  At that time, he was residing in Atlantic 
City, New Jersey. 
 On June 10, 2010, a grand jury returned an indictment against Wolfe charging him 
with one count of failing to register as a sex offender, as required by SORNA, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250.  The then-pending revocation of Wolfe’s supervised 
release was transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  On November 18, 2010, 
Wolfe entered a plea of guilty for violating SORNA, pursuant to a plea agreement.  
Under the agreement, Wolfe waived his right “to appeal or collaterally attack [his] 
conviction, sentence or any other matter relating to [the] prosecution,” subject to four 
limited exceptions.  The plea agreement provided that the government could “[m]ake 
whatever sentencing recommendation as to imprisonment [for the SORNA violation] . . . 
which [it] deem[ed] appropriate.”  The agreement further authorized the government to: 
“Comment on the evidence and circumstances of the case; bring to the 
Court’s attention all facts relevant to sentencing including evidence relating 
to dismissed counts, if any, and to the character and any criminal conduct 
of the defendant; address the Court regarding the nature and seriousness of 
the offense; respond factually to questions raised by the Court; correct 
factual inaccuracies in the presentence report or sentencing record; and 
rebut any statement of facts made by or on behalf of the defendant at 
sentencing.” 
 
However, the government also committed to “agree that whatever sentence [was] 
imposed [for Wolfe’s SORNA violation] is to run concurrent to any sentence that may be 
  
4 
imposed . . . for a pending violation of [Wolfe’s] federal supervised release.”  During the 
plea colloquy, the District Court reviewed these provisions with Wolfe, who indicated 
that he understood them.  The District Court made clear that the plea agreement was only 
binding as between the parties, and therefore did not bind the District Court. 
 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court first addressed Wolfe’s SORNA 
violation.  The Court heard extended argument from both the government and Wolfe 
regarding the appropriate length of the sentence.  The government strenuously advocated 
for a 37-month sentence, at the top of the Guidelines range.  In its presentation, the 
government emphasized Wolfe’s numerous prior offenses, which included three sex 
offenses, the severity of his prior offenses, the fact that he had knowingly violated 
SORNA while on supervised release, and the certainty that he would reoffend.  The 
government did not otherwise mention the supervised release violation.  After hearing 
Wolfe’s argument and testimony, the District Court imposed a 36-month sentence. 
 The District Court then turned to the sanction for Wolfe’s violation of supervised 
release, and inquired whether that sentence should be imposed consecutively or 
concurrently to Wolfe’s SORNA sentence: 
THE COURT: So what’s the Government’s view about the 
consecutive/concurrent issue?  Because I think there is an agreement on 
this, isn’t there? 
THE GOVERNMENT: There is, sir, and I’m at a loss to be able to – I’m at 
a loss to be able to explain that.  I was not the prosecutor initially on the 
case.  I was asked to come in for sentencing purposes, so I did not negotiate 
that particular part of the plea agreement.  I am told that it was – 
THE COURT: Well, it was negotiated. 
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THE GOVERNMENT: It was something that was negotiated in order to get 
the agreement in this case. 
THE COURT: Okay, but in terms of the authority of the Court, you would 
agree with me that that’s a different issue from the issues that we just spent 
an hour and a half plus – 
THE GOVERNMENT: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: – worrying about? Wouldn’t you agree? 
THE GOVERNMENT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. But, obviously, you’re bound by your agreement and 
I’m not going to ask you to retreat from that. 
 
After further discussion with Wolfe’s counsel, the Court revoked Wolfe’s supervised 
release and imposed a 12-month sentence to be served consecutively to Wolfe’s sentence 
for the SORNA violation.  Wolfe filed a timely appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Wolfe appeals the District Court’s imposition of consecutive sentences on the 
grounds that the government’s conduct at sentencing violated his plea agreement, and 
that, consequently, he must be resentenced.  In the absence of a contemporaneous 
objection, we review the government’s adherence to its obligations under a plea 
agreement for plain error.  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).  Under 
plain error review, Wolfe must show that (1) there was an error which was (2) “clear or 
obvious,” (3) “affected the outcome of the proceedings,” and (4) “seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quotation marks and 
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citations omitted).  We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo.  United States 
v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001). 
III. 
 We would normally decline to exercise jurisdiction over Wolfe’s appeal because it 
is not permitted under his appellate waiver.  See United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 
203 (3d Cir. 2007).  The record reveals that Wolfe’s plea is valid:  it was entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily, and the sentencing judge fully complied with Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563.  Moreover, none of 
the four exceptions to Wolfe’s appellate waiver are implicated here,1 and Wolfe does not 
argue that the result “would work a miscarriage of justice.”  Gwinnett, 483 F.3d at 203.  
Thus, the parties do not dispute that, if enforced, the waiver would not permit an appeal 
of this within-Guidelines sentence. 
 Nevertheless, it is well-established that “[a] defendant’s appellate waiver is not 
enforceable if the government breaches its own obligations under a plea agreement.”  
United States v. Schwartz, 511 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  
Accordingly, Wolfe offers two arguments that the government breached its promise to 
                                              
1
 The exceptions to Wolfe’s appellate waiver are:  (1) Wolfe may filed a direct 
appeal from his sentence if the government appealed from the sentence; (2) Wolfe may 
assert a claim that the “sentence on any count of conviction exceeds the statutory 
maximum for that count”; (3) may could assert a claim that “the sentencing judge 
erroneously departed upwards under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines”; or (4) Wolfe may 
assert a claim that the sentencing judge “imposed an unreasonable sentence above the 
final Sentencing Guidelines range. 
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“agree that whatever sentence is imposed [for Wolfe’s SORNA violation] is to run 
concurrent to any sentence that may be imposed for a violation of [Wolfe’s] federal 
supervised release.”  First, he contends that the prosecutor used her sentencing argument 
for Wolfe’s SORNA violation to advocate in favor of consecutive sentences.  Second, he 
argues that the prosecutor’s response to the District Court concerning the 
recommendation for concurrent sentences effectively undermined the government’s 
commitment.
2
  Wolfe’s challenges fail. 
 Our task is to “evaluate the [challenged] conduct and determine whether it violates 
the government’s obligations under the plea agreement.”  United States v. Larkin, 629 
F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).  We interpret the plea agreement according to “general 
principles of contract law,” McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 95-96 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), and, mindful of the government’s “tremendous bargaining 
power,” we “strictly construe the text against [the government].”  United States v. Baird, 
218 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 2000).  We do not review the allegedly violated provision in 
isolation, but rather with an eye towards the agreement as a whole.  See Larkin, 629 F.3d 
at 189-91; Schwartz, 511 F.3d at 405-06.  The ultimate decision of the District Court to 
disregard the agreement is, of course, irrelevant to our inquiry, because a plea agreement 
binds only the parties.  United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006). 
                                              
2
 Wolfe also asserts that he may appeal the sentence because there is no plea 
agreement governing the revocation of his supervised release.  However, he offers no 
argument to revisit the sentence that is independent of the alleged breach. 
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 First, we reject Wolfe’s contention that the government used its sentencing 
arguments in the SORNA portion of the hearing to persuade the District Court to impose 
consecutive sentences.  The entire premise of this argument rings hollow, because the 
District Court treated the sentencing for the SORNA and supervised release violations as 
distinct issues.  The District Court and the government agreed that the decision to impose 
consecutive or concurrent sentences was “a different issue from the issues that [the 
parties] had just spend an hour and a half plus . . . worrying about.”  Moreover, the 
arguments offered by the government were expressly permitted by the plea provisions 
allowing the government to comment on “all facts relevant to sentencing,” and therefore 
fell “within the range of expectations reasonably understood by [Wolfe] when [he] 
entered [his] plea of guilty.”  Larkin, 629 F.3d at 186; see id. at 189-91 (finding 
government’s briefing on sentencing enhancement permissibly “provided an assessment 
of the law and relevant facts that would support application of the enhancement” pursuant 
to plea provisions allowing response to court’s request for briefing, despite stipulation 
that enhancement was inapplicable).  Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the initial 
SORNA sentencing discussion – which was entirely proper – can be understood as 
violating the government’s obligations to agree to a concurrent sentence for Wolfe’s 
violation of supervised release. 
 Second, the prosecutor’s response to the District Court’s inquiry regarding the 
concurrent sentence recommendation was not inconsistent with her promise to “agree” to 
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a concurrent sentence.  Wolfe is correct that the government may breach a plea 
agreement with statements that either contradict or implicitly undermine its obligations.  
See United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 486-87 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding prosecutor’s 
repeated statements that defendant should not be released into community plainly 
amounted to recommendation for a life sentence and contradicted obligations under plea 
agreement to request sentence within Guidelines range).  And viewed alone, the 
prosecutor’s statement that she was “at a loss to be able to explain” the basis for the 
agreement is admittedly ambiguous.  However, we must construe the challenged 
statements in context and “against the entire backdrop of the proceedings,” Larkin, 629 
F.3d at 191, and fairly construed, the prosecutor was simply attempting to explain that 
she was unfamiliar with that provision of the plea agreement.  The response of the 
District Court – which cut off the prosecutor’s explanation of the government’s 
agreement – is informative in this regard.  See United States v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, 38 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that a district court is in the best position to understand the 
meaning of a party’s conduct and statements responding to the court’s requests).  Here, 
the District Court responded by expressly recognizing the prosecutor’s commitment to 
agree to a concurrent sentence and stated that it would not ask the prosecutor to retreat 
from that commitment.  This strongly suggests that the prosecutor’s comment should not 
be interpreted as a retreat from the plea agreement. 
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 Thus, viewed in context, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s truncated remarks 
were a “thinly veiled attempt to . . . influence the District Court.”  Larkin, 629 F.3d at 
191.  Nor did this brief utterance implicitly undermine the very position the government 
had committed to adopt, as the repeated statements did in Hodge.  See 412 F.3d at 486-
87.  The prosecutor may not have spiritedly advocated for a concurrent sentence, but the 
plea provisions did not require her to do so.  She was obligated to agree, and we do not 
understand her conduct to be inconsistent with that obligation. 
 Moreover, Wolfe’s argument attacks the prosecutor’s honest response to the 
District Court’s questioning, which a prosecutor’s ethical obligations require of her.  See 
United States v. Allen, 434 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] plea agreement does 
not bar the government from honestly answering the district court’s questions.  To the 
contrary, honest response of the government to direct judicial inquiry is a prosecutor’s 
professional obligation that cannot be barred, eroded or impaired by a plea agreement.” 
(marks and citation omitted)).  We will not penalize the government for adhering to such 
obligations.  In sum, the prosecutor’s truncated remarks – though perhaps not as effective 
as Wolfe might desire – do not amount to a breach of the plea agreement. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
